Indians, who form almost half of the population of Peninsular Malaysia, with traditionally a stronger hold in urban areas and non-agricultural employment, also benefited from the expanding economy. However, the Indian community seems to have experienced recent deterioration in infant mortality, unemployment levels, and in the proportion of places in institutions of higher education (Kusnic & DaVanzo, 1982) .
This study of ethnic variations in fertility levels and trends updates earlier analyses of trends in Malaysia with recent data from the 1980 census of population (Saw, 1967a; Cho, Palmore & Saunders, 1968; Palmore, Chander & Fernandez, 1975; Hirschman & Fernandez, 1980; Sidhu & Jones, 1981, Jones & Tan, 1985) .
Material
The data came from the vital registration system and population censuses of Malaysia. The vital registration system provided information on the number of births in each year, regularly published by the Malaysian Department of Statistics and (prior to 1963) in the Reports of the Registrar-General on Births, Deaths, Marriages, Divorces, and Adoptions. The registration of births may have been about 90% complete in the 1950s (Saw, 1964) and virtually complete after the late 1960s (Cho et al., 1968) . To the extent that coverage of birth registration improved over time, the fertility indices underestimate the magnitude of the fertility decline. The denominators for the fertility measures are based upon census counts and a consistent series of intercensal estimates (Hirschman, 1974) . The census populations of 1947, 1957, 1970, and 1980 were adjusted for underenumeration (1970 and 1980) and other inconsistencies to make them as comparable as possible.
Results
Figure 1 presents, for the 30 years from 1947 to 1983, the crude birth rate, the general fertility rate and the total fertility rate (only available since 1958). The crude birth rate influenced by age-sex composition as well as by reproductive behaviour was depressed by the relatively unbalanced age-sex structure of the late 1940s (which followed a period of heavy immigration and the dislocation of the Japanese occupation), especially for Chinese and Indians, and its levelling off in the 1970s was 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 Year Fig. 1 . Trends in indices of fertility. Peninsular Malaysia, 1947-83. due, in large part, to the rapid increase in the proportion of the most fertile groups. The general and total fertility rates provide more refined measures of underlying fertility behaviour. There were two distinctly different trends of fertility for the post World War II era. From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, both the crude birth rate and the general fertility rate rose, although there were wide year to year fluctuations. Then from the late 1950s to the present, there was continuing decline. Whereas the crude birth rate decline was checked in the 1970s, the general and total fertility rate declines showed only a slight pause around 1980. One interpretation of the decade of persistently high, perhaps rising, fertility in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Saw, 1967b) is that improvements in health and rising levels of income due to the rubber boom of the Korean War period allowed many families to attain high fertility. Except for the massive resettlement of rural people, largely Chinese, into 'new villages' (nucleated settlements, often adjacent to existing towns) during the Malayan emergency (Sandhu, 1964) there was little structural change in the economy or society that would have motivated families to have few children. However, by the late 1950s, it appears that conditions were right for the beginnings of a downward trend in fertility levels.
The three fertility rates for selected years from 1947 to 1983 and changes in them (Tables 1 and 2) for the total population of Peninsular Malaysia and separately for Malays, Chinese, and Indians show that fertility assessed by the crude birth rates was high, more than 40 births per thousand population, for all three ethnic groups in the late 1940s. The general and total fertility rates indicate that fertility was considerably higher for Chinese and especially for Indians than for Malays. Part of the reason for the lower Malay fertility may have been higher levels of marital disruption, or less complete registration of Malay births (Smith, 1952; Hirschman & Fernandez, 1980) . By the late 1950s and early 1960s, fertility began to decline for all three ethnic (1978 ( TFR=4283, 1983 TFR=4538). Fertility differentials in Malaysia 1947-58 1958-63 1963-70 1970-75 1975-78 1978-80 1980-83 1970-80 1978-83 General fertility rate 1947-58 1958-63 1963-70 1970-75 1975-78 1978-80 1980-83 1970-80 1978-83 Total fertility rate 1958-63 1963-70 1970-75 1975-78 1978-80 1980-83 1970-80 1978-83
The challenge of age structure As noted by Sidhu & Jones (1981) Along with the 'normalization' of the age structure in the late 1940s and its effects in producing a broad-based age pyramid, the sharp decline in fertility among the Chinese and Indians after 1958 was a major reason for the rise in the proportion of females aged 15-49 in the population, because it led to an undercutting at the base of the age pyramid. This is a normal characteristic of populations undergoing fertility decline, and means that crude birth rates seldom reflect the strength of the fertility decline, which is better portrayed by trends in more refined measures of fertility. Even the general fertility rate does not always fully portray the strength of the fertility decline, if there is a tendency for reproductive-age women to become more heavily concentrated in the ages of peak reproduction, but in the present data both it and the total fertility rate showed similar trends over the period.
For each ethnic group, there has been a tendency for the age distribution within the group of reproductive-age women to grow younger, reflecting the entry into the younger reproductive ages of the large birth cohorts of the 1950s and early 1960s. The effect of this on crude birth rates is hard to determine, because rising age at marriage and increasing use of contraception meant that fertility was increasingly concentrated in the more central reproductive ages.
By the 1990s, the earlier declines in fertility will bring about a decline in the proportion of the total population made up of females in the main reproductive ages. After that point, further declines in fertility will be reflected in a sharper decline in the crude birth rate and hence the rate of population increase.
Changes in marital patterns
Changes in marriage have played a major role in the fertility decline observed in Peninsular Malaysia in recent decades. Since births outside wedlock have traditionally been rare for all ethnic groups, age at marriage and proportions married have had direct implications for^fertility. Looking back three and four decades, family structure, patterns of marriage and marital distribution differed substantially for the different ethnic groups. Arranged marriages were the norm for all three groups, but for the Chinese they took place at older ages than for the others. Near-universal marriage characterized the Malays and Indians, and only in the Chinese was there a non-trivial proportion of women who did not marry before the end of their reproductive years (around 3%). The age gap between spouses was wide, especially for the Indians and to a lesser extent the Malays. In 1957, the difference in median age at first marriage between men and women was 7-2 years for Indians, 5-0 for Malays and 3-7 for Chinese. For the Indians, this was partly due to the shortage of potential spouses in a traditionally male-dominated immigrant community. But the Indian and Malay communities had a tradition of wide age differences between spouses. The Chinese, despite a relative shortage of females, maintained a smaller gap in age of spouses, and a larger proportion of the Chinese men simply remained unmarried (Jones, 1980) . Fertility is affected not only by age at marriage and proportions marrying, but also by marital dissolution and the extent of remarriage. Here, too, the situation differed considerably between the three ethnic groups. Divorce was much more common among the Malays than among the other groups-indeed, from the early post-war years (and probably earlier) until the mid-1970s, divorce rates among Malays in Kelantan and Trengganu appear to have been the highest in the world .
The effect of marital disruption on fertility was tempered by the frequency and rapidity of remarriage; even so, at the time of the 1947 census, about 8% of reproductive-age Malay females were currently divorced, compared with below 1% of Chinese and Indians (Sidhu & Jones, 1981 (Table 5 ).
Such remarkable changes, which were accompanied by an almost complete shift from parent-arranged to self-arranged marriages, meant that vast numbers of Malay and Indian women were still single in their 20s in 1980 (240,000 compared with 19,000 in 1957) and had virtually no role models from earlier generations to guide them. The deep-seated social changes underlying these trends were no doubt influenced by expansion of education, especially for girls, rising prosperity and wider employment opportunities for women (many of them only available through migration) and a communication revolution Lee, 1982) .
At the same time, rates of widowhood declined due to lowered mortality arid a narrowing of age differences between spouses, and rates of divorce for Malays declined sharply in the 1950s and early 1960s, a decline that resulted from many of the same sources as did the rise in age at marriage (Jones, 1980 (Rahman, 1983 As far as modern methods are concerned, the condom and sterilization were scarcely used by Malay couples, but heavily used by Chinese and Indians, whereas Malays and Chinese relied on the pill much more than Indians. The Indian pattern, then, showed a substantial proportion of contraception oriented to stopping childbearing, rather than spacing births, whereas stopping/spacing motivations for the other groups are less clear.
Age patterns of fertility
Comparable shifts in age-specific fertility patterns accompanied the changes in the marital structure of the female population. Both age patterns of fertility and the extent and timing of the decline among different age groups of women differ distinctly by ethnicity (Figs 2 and 3) .
At the onset of the fertility decline in the late 1950s, the Malay and Indian schedules of fertility were markedly younger than that for the Chinese, due largely to younger average age at marriage. In the 15-19 age group, the fertility rate for Malays was more than four times and for Indians more than five times that of the Chinese, in spite of the Chinese total fertility rate being higher than the Malay by more than a half child per woman. Since younger childbearing tends to produce a higher rate of population growth, due to the shorter mean length of generation (Coale & Tye, 1961) the higher Chinese total fertility rate in 1958 did not necessarily imply higher population growth. Figure 2 shows that in 1958 Chinese women had considerably lower fertility in the two youngest age groups (15-19 and 20-24) than the other ethnic groups, but after reaching a peak in the late twenties, Chinese age-specific fertility rates above age 30 years were far higher than those for the Indians or Malays. In contrast, the Malay and Indian age patterns of fertility reached a peak in the early twenties and declined thereafter rather more sharply than did the Chinese. Malay fertility was quite low for women above age 30. This reflected the influence both of the higher proportion of Malay women not currently married at the older ages due to high divorce rates, and the lower marital fertility rates of older women, irrespective of whether they had been married only once or several times (Palmore & Marzuki, 1969; Hirschman & Fernandez, 1980) . The patterns of fertility decline in the years following 1958 reflect the influence of these initial fertility schedules (Fig. 3) These ethnic differences in the age patterns of fertility and the fertility transition by age groups account for the changes in the shape and shifts of the curves for the years depicted in Fig. 2 (3) that throughout the entire period of fertility transition, Chinese fertility for the two youngest age groups remained below the levels for the other two ethnic groups; as age at first marriage rose and teenage marriages became uncommon for all three ethnic groups, differences in age-specific fertility rates for those aged 15-19 narrowed considerably; fertility of the 20-24 age group, however, consistently remained lowest for the Chinese; (4) that from 1958 to 1970, the sharp decline at the older ages brought the Chinese fertility schedule below that of Malays aged 35 and over, although still higher than that for the Indians for all ages above 25; the higher age-specific fertility rates for the Chinese compared to the Indians at the older ages may be due to the Chinese rates having been pushed up by the older pattern of childbearing or the Indian rates having been pushed down by the higher incidence of widowhood (due to the historically wide age gap between spouses and also higher mortality levels); by the 1980s, however, the Chinese and Indian fertility schedules had more or less merged above the peak years of childbearing;
(5) that the fertility curves for the Chinese and Indians above the prime childbearing years have become more concave, conforming to the expected shape of controlled fertility curves (Knodel, 1977) ; the concave shape of the fertility schedules above age 25 implies sharp drops in fertility once desired family size is reached, so that childbearing rarely continues above age 40 and is almost unheard of at ages 45 and above; the shape of the fertility curve for older Malay women, on the other hand, has changed relatively little. In the fertility transition over 25 years, then, although the Chinese decline started from the older ages and the Indian from the youngest ages, both widened to cover all ages, suggesting that rising age at marriage and family limitation within marriage combined to produce the drop in fertility to levels as low as those prevailing in many western countries-as recently as the 1960s. The more moderate Malay decline, on the other hand, confined mainly to the younger ages below 25, reflects the importance of trends in marital structure. The more complex Malay patterns for the middle and older ages (falling then rising fertility over time) appear to reflect the interplay between changes in the timing of births consequent on sharp increases in age at marriage, and changes in completed fertility in the midstream of the Malay fertility transition.
Change in crude birth rates: 1958 to 1970 and 1970 to 1980 It is possible to study the relative effects of changing age-sex composition, marital structure and marital fertility on the fertility declines for each ethnic group by analysing the change in crude birth rates between two dates. Unfortunately, because of the unavailability of census or nationwide survey data after 1980, it is not possible to do this for the period" of greatest interest between 1978 and 1983 when Malay fertility rates rose. The method of analysis adopted here is that of Retherford & Cho (1974) which separates the contribution to changes in the crude birth rate of changes in (i) age-sex composition of the population, (ii) marital structure as indicated by the proportion of women currently married (and therefore exposed to the risk of childbearing), and (iii) marital age-specific fertility rates.
Marital fertility can be further analysed by birth order or parity. Total marital 'fertility is a sum of lower order (first, second, and third) and higher order (fourth or higher) births. A rise in age at marriage and delay in the onset of childbearing may defer lower order births to the older age categories, and perhaps even contribute to a temporary rise in overall marital fertility. Tables 6 and 7 show the contributions of these three components to changes in the crude birth rates of the three ethnic groups for two periods, 1958-70 and 1970-80. Age-specific marital fertility.
In Table 7 the contributions to changes between 1970 and 1980 by order of births are also shown. The contribution of each component change is expressed in terms of the points of the crude birth rate. The row figures indicate the effect for each age group, while the column totals show the sum effect of each factor. The grand total is equivalent to the total change in the crude birth rate over the period. Table 6 shows that for the period 1958-70 the strong decline in the Malay crude birth rate by more than 11 points was due mainly to age structure (almost 3 points) and marital structure (8V2 points), the latter especially in the two youngest age groups.
Marital fertility barely changed during the period, since the slight declines below age 25 were offset by slight increases for the older ages. -1970 - , 1980 Chinese-30-5, 25-2; Indian-30-8, 29-8. There was a very different pattern for the 1970-80 period ( Table 7 strongly suggests a shift in the timing of creation of small and medium size families and a decline in the incidence of large families among Malays, and that the halt in the downward transition is little more than a partial 'making-up' of births by Malay women who are marrying later.
The opposite was true for the Chinese. The decline in the Chinese crude birth rate was achieved in spite of age structure changes which were making for higher fertility.
In the first period (Table 6 ), however, the age structure effects were more than offset by changing marital status distribution, and it was the decline in marital fertility that was the primary influence in lowering the Chinese crude birth rate. By the second period, 1970-80 (Table 7) , the effect of declining marital fertility was even more pronounced. Had it not been for the substantial decline in marital fertility, there would have been no fall in the Chinese crude birth rate since the lowered proportion married was not able to offset completely the greater tendency of age structure changes to raise the birth rate. That the fall in marital fertility among the Chinese involved an actual limitation of family size is evident (Table 7) . There was a dramatic drop in fifth and higher order births which alone would have reduced the crude birth rate by 7-3 points. Even third and fourth order births fell in the 1970-80 period. The parity analysis shows a trend towards a pattern of fertility characteristic of a population with a high degree of control over fertility.
Like the Chinese, the Indians experienced the combined negative effects on fertility of changes in proportions married and marital fertility, which more than offset the positive effect of the age structure (Tables 6 and 7) . Unlike the Chinese experience, however, it was primarily the sharp drop in the numbers marrying at ages below their early twenties that lowered Indian fertility. Particularly in the first period 1958-70, the effect of changing marital structure contributed so substantially to fertility decline that the crude birth rate showed an overall decline of 14-5 points. In the 1970s, however, the number of Indian women entering their childbearing years was so large that their positive effect on fertility could not be completely offset by the increase in age at first marriage, and it was only because of the additional modest decline in marital fertility that the crude birth rate fell slightly over the decade. Although the decline in marital fertility was smaller in the second than in the first period, the parity analysis (Table 7) shows that, again like the Chinese, family size limitation was occurring. Fourth, and particularly fifth and higher order births declined over the 1970s. The increase in first, second and third order births was clearly due to the postponement of childbearing because of the higher age at first marriage. The future of Malay fertility is much more uncertain, since the evidence points in different directions. The rapid rise in age at marriage has been the major factor in the decline of Malay fertility. With a female median age at marriage of 22 in 1980 and significant numbers of unmarried women in their late twenties and early thirties, there will certainly be demographic pressures for a continued downward trend in Malay levels of reproduction. But the rise in period fertility from 1978 to 1983, the emergence of a high fertility region in the east coast states, and the persistence of high fertility norms suggest that the pace of the Malay fertility transition may slacken. The parity analysis from 1970 to 1980 suggests a decline in large Malay families-especially of five or more children. However, the relative cost of children, particularly educational cost, may be less of a constraint for Malay than for Chinese and Indian parents (Hirschman, 1986) . It seems that Malay fertility transitions will continue, but at a somewhat slower pace, and the fertility differential between the Malays and the other ethnic communities may continue to widen for some time.
As regards recent policy changes, in September 1982 the Prime Minister stated that Malaysia should aim-for a population of 70 million (almost a five-fold increase over the present population), and this aim has now been formalized by its inclusion in Malaysia's development plan. Child relief tax allowances have been increased for every subsequent child instead of the earlier downward scale, and maternity benefits have been extended up to the fifth child. The Prime Minister exhorted Malaysians to 'go for five', and other politicians have sung the praises of early marriages and large families.
What effect all this will have (Jones & Lim, 1985) depends on the extent to which people are swayed by appeals to the national interest and by politicians' claims that large families are good for them. In this most personal of all decisions, it would be surprising if many people put the national interest over private concerns; unless Malaysians are different from the French (exhorted by successive governments to have more children, to little apparent effect) it will take substantial economic incentives to put very much upward pressure on fertility. The incentives offered thus far in Malaysia are symbolic rather than economically meaningful, and it is unlikely that substantial subsidies for childbearing will be introduced.
It may be that, for some Malays, appeals to ethnic solidarity will be effective, particularly if these appeals can be linked to religious revivalism. But to encourage ethnic rivalry would be a dangerous policy indeed, and though there are suspicions in non-Malay quarters that change in the relative size of ethnic groups is the ultimate object of the 70 million policy, this has not been apparent, nor is it likely to become so, in public statements by political leaders.
